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Prophets or Praetorians?
The Uptonian Paradox and the
Powell Corollary
ROBERT M. CASSIDY
“A [military] philosophy grows from the minds and hearts, social mores
and customs, traditions and environment of a people. It is the product of
national and racial attributes, geography, the nature of a potential enemy
threat, standards of living and national traditions, influenced and modified
by great military philosophers, like Clausewitz and Mahan, and by great
1
national leaders like Napoleon.”
“The major risk of a big-war predilection is that the US Army will retain the
thinking, infrastructure, and forces appropriate for a large-scale war that
may not materialize while failing to properly adapt itself to conduct
simultaneous smaller engagements of the type that seem to be occurring
2
with increasing frequency.”

T

hose quotations highlight the salience of military culture as an influence on
how military institutions perceive and conduct war. Military culture as an
explanation of behavior may be particularly relevant to the US Army now because the Army is transforming, is still engaged in a small counterinsurgency war
in Afghanistan, and is currently engaged in stability operations to counter terrorist and subversive paramilitary elements and thugs who use guerrilla hit-and-run
tactics against coalition forces in Iraq. In short, military culture comprises the beliefs and attitudes within a military organization that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force. These attitudes can impede or foster innovation
and adaptation, and military culture sometimes exhibits preferences for big wars
in favor of small wars. This article discusses one characteristic of US military
culture that since the end of the 19th century has had a profound influence on how
the American military views the nexus between politics and war.
This characteristic is the Uptonian paradox, named so because Emory
Upton’s influence on American military thought contributed to the following
contradiction: the US Army has embraced Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle
130

Parameters

of war, but it has also tended to distance itself from Clausewitz’s overarching
theme—the linkage of the military instrument to political purposes. To be sure, the
propensity of 19th- and early 20th-century Western militaries to divorce the military sphere from the political sphere was not solely Uptonian—this inclination
stemmed at first from the widespread influence of Jomini, whose work was more
influential than Clausewitz’s for most of the 19th century. In Upton’s writings,
however, he strengthened the tendency to separate the civil and military spheres by
advocating minimal civilian control to maximize military effectiveness.3
A similar phenomenon, engendering similar tendencies, manifested itself after the Vietnam War. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the US military underwent an intellectual and professional renaissance after hitting its nadir at the end
of the Vietnam War. This renaissance displayed an Uptonian character because it
refocused the Army exclusively on the big-war paradigm, eschewed several
studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam, and embraced a book sponsored
by the Army War College that asserted the US military failed in Vietnam not because it didn’t adapt to counterinsurgency, but because it didn’t fight that war
conventionally enough. Consequently, the big-war-only school was ultimately
codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine—a prescription for the use of force
that essentially proscribes anything other than conventional war. This article
postulates that the Uptonian paradox remains an important influence on the US
military and is shown in two tendencies: the inclination to separate the military
and political domains after a war begins, and the tendency of the US military to
prescribe its preferred paradigm for war to its civilian leadership.
Regular Army officers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries viewed
Emory Upton, whose ideas included an unconcealed contempt for civilian control of the military, as a warrior prophet. Likewise, the US military of the 1990s
worshiped Colin Powell, because he masterfully managed the 1991 Persian Gulf
War by closely adhering to the Weinberger-Powell rules on the use of force. By
advocating prescriptive policies that sought to circumscribe how force would be
used and to mitigate civilian influence, were Upton and Powell essentially the
Praetorian guards of a very Jominian way of looking at war? And if they were, so
what? Why is this subject even germane? Simply stated, the Uptonian paradox
poses significant challenges for an Army that must be an effective instrument of
policy in a security environment that makes asymmetric threats more likely than
symmetric ones. In addition, military cultural resistance to change can be an obstacle to the Army’s efforts to transform into a more versatile and relevant force.4

Major Robert M. Cassidy is the S3 (Operations and Training Officer) of the 4th Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He is a graduate of the French Joint
Defense College and previously served as an assistant professor of international relations
at West Point and as a troop commander in the 82d Airborne Division. He has a Ph.D. in
international security from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
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Upton and the Army
Before the Civil War and Upton’s emergence as a military thinker, the
Army’s leadership was not looking realistically at how to fight an American war.
“They expected society to adapt itself to their mode of war-making; they made
little effort to adapt their ideas on warfare to American society.”5 The absolute
character of the Civil War would have been anticipated by Clausewitz, but not by
the American military’s preferred oracle of military strategy before the Civil
War—Jomini. In fact, the Civil War, coupled with the victory of the Prussian
army over France in 1871 and the translation of Clausewitz’s On War in 1873,
were the precursors to what would become an Uptonian understanding of
Clausewitz through Jominian filters. This interpretation, what’s more, reflected
both the Jominian separation of military affairs from politics and Clausewitz’s
precept that all wars tend to move toward the absolute. Emory Upton, “the single
most influential officer in sealing the commitment of the officer corps to the conservative, professionalist view of war,”6 was a true-faith apostle of the Prussian
system, and he embodied a fusion of Jomini with the newly preeminent theorist
of war, Clausewitz.
The isolation of the military on the America’s western frontier after the
Civil War was a key condition for the intellectual and professional awakening of
the US Army. Isolated from civilian society and allowed time for introspection,
Army officers came under the influence of reformers like William Sherman and
Emory Upton. These luminaries looked abroad for most of their ideas. Upton, in
particular, focused on the Prussian military system.
Emory Upton was the most influential young officer among the US
Army reformers. After the resounding German victory in the Franco-Prussian
War, the US Army’s reverence for French military institutions diminished and
US officers became enamored of the German military system. In sending Upton
on his inspection of foreign militaries in 1875-1876, Sherman instructed him to
place a particular emphasis on German military institutions. The Armies of Europe and Asia, the first study to emerge from Upton’s tour, revealed in a comprehensive fashion the degree to which the US Army as a profession was behind its
European counterparts. Upton recommended that the Army establish advanced
military schools, a general staff, a system of personnel evaluation reports, and
promotion by examination.7
The development of professional journals allowed Upton and others to
share their ideas with the Army’s core leadership. In 1878, Major General
Winfield Scott Hancock established the Military Service Institution of the
United States, with the purpose of promoting “writing and discussion about military science and military history.”8 In 1879, the United Service Journal also began publication. Sherman encouraged these institutions to supplement the school
system. Moreover, the purpose of the postgraduate school system that Sherman
established in 1881 was to provide a “pyramid of institutions through which the
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“In the late 1970s and 1980s, the US military
underwent an intellectual and professional
renaissance after hitting its nadir
at the end of the Vietnam War.”

officer could learn the special skills of his own branch of service and then the attitudes and principles of high command.”9 The journals and the schools fed ideas
to each other, with the journals affording an outlet for ideas and studies nurtured
at the schools. Within the same decade Clausewitz’s On War was translated into
English in 1873 and a host of articles related to the Prussian military began to appear in US professional military journals. American officers tended to accept the
German methods unquestioningly, and by the end of the century, American military thinkers fully accepted the German general staff model.10
It was Upton’s second work, however, that had the most influence in
shaping US Army attitudes during the late 19th century. Anyone interested in US
military history considered Upton’s Military Policy of the United States as the
standard work in the field. In this work Upton argued “that all the defects of the
American military system rested upon a fundamental, underlying flaw, excessive
civilian control of the military.”11 As officers became isolated from the rest of the
country, they embraced Upton’s ideas in the late 19th century. Articles written in
the new professional journals that suggested broad approval of Upton’s ideas became prevalent. One authority on US military history, Russell F. Weigley, asserts
that Upton did lasting damage “in setting the main current of American military
thought not to the task of shaping military institutions that would serve both military and national purposes, but to the futile task of demanding that the national institutions be adjusted to purely military expediency.”12
Published after Upton’s death, The Military Policy of the United States
argued for a strong regular military force. The US Army subsequently embraced
The Military Policy of the United States in its disputes with the militia advocates.
Upton considered the Prussian model to be excellent because of its general staff
system, mass army, and freedom from civilian control. Until the end of his life he
endeavored to get Congress to implement reforms based on the German army system. However, many believe that Upton misinterpreted Clausewitz and the nature
of a liberal democracy. In Military Policy, he argued that officers alone should be
entrusted with directing armies in the field. By vilifying the Secretary of War,
Upton was advocating a complete independence of the Army from civilian control. Enamored of the German war machine, Upton wanted the US Army to
Autumn 2003
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achieve a similar status. Upton was willing to let the President retain the title of
commander in chief, but his remarks about the defects in the Constitution (that encourage the President to assume the character of military commander) bespoke his
real intentions. Upton renounced the military policy of the United States as one of
imprudence and weakness, largely because uninformed civilians dominated the
military. However, Upton was incapable of realizing that one could not simply
graft a European-style professional army onto the American liberal system. According to military historian Stephen Ambrose, Upton failed to grasp the interrelationship between the political and military spheres in a democracy.13
As a result of the influence that Upton and other military reformers exerted on the US Army’s core preferences, the Army developed a very deductive
method for understanding warfare based largely on the Prussian “science of
war.” As one writer notes, “The Army objected to the use of the armed forces as a
police force . . . and argued that the Army must always be governed by classic
military principles.”14 As a result, the Army developed an approach to war that
was biased toward decisive and offensive doctrine, one derived from Europe and
primarily suitable for the European theater. Moreover, the efforts of Sherman and
Upton helped the Army institutionalize an officer educational system that focused on the principles of war and which cultivated uniformity of thought. The
principles of war, as taught in the Army’s educational system, led increasingly to
a rigid conception of warfare. The American Army came to favor the science of
war over the art of war, resulting in a stiff adherence to principles and rules.
It is also perplexing that in the late 19th century the US Army embraced
the conventional Prussian military system as a paragon of professionalism at the
same time that the American Army was engaged in a frontier war against the Indians—the most unorthodox of the US Army’s 19th-century enemies. The frontier
employment of the Army against the Indians was itself a paradox: the experience
made the Army unsuited for orthodox warfare at the same time that its focus on
orthodox war made it unsuited for fighting the Indians. Although most Army officers recognized the American Indian as a master of guerrilla warfare, the Army
never institutionalized a counter-guerrilla doctrine—nor were there training programs, military schools, or professional literature on how to fight Indians. In the
view of one expert on the Indian wars, “lacking a formal body of doctrine for unconventional war, the Army waged conventional war against the Indians.”15
In essence, almost every professional Army officer in the late 19th century was convinced that the only way to solve the civil-military relations issue
was for the civilian authorities to yield military policy to the military. As Russell
Weigley wrote, “Here was still another pernicious fruit of the divorcement which
the professional Army had allowed between itself and civilian America.”16 Separated from the civilians and disdainful of them as soldiers, Army officers were
not inclined to accept the highest military guidance from citizens whom they perceived to be inept in military matters. As generals in chief, William Sherman and
Philip Sheridan had also looked for Uptonian solutions. Moreover, they all
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helped proselytize among the American officers the dogma that military policy
must be left to military men alone. Weigley offers a cogent summary of this problem: “The officer corps had lost sight of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is but
an extension of politics by other means.”17 As the 19th century drew to a close,
the Army’s core elites refused to acknowledge that in war military aims cannot be
divorced from political purposes, and that the ultimate decisions rested with the
civilian political leaders of the state.18

World War II: Paragon of the Paradigm
Many of Upton’s ideas were implemented under Secretary of War Elihu
Root from 1901 to 1903. Root established the War Department Staff—the first
high-level coordinating agency responsible for the creation and development of
doctrine. The Root reforms also promulgated a system of service schools for the
Army, subsequently serving as the principal sources of applied doctrine. However, Root ignored Upton’s notion of eliminating civilian control of the military.
Beginning with the establishment of the General Staff by Root in 1903, during
the first half of the 20th century the Army exhibited a long-term trend toward
the emergence of the “massive armed force.” As Morris Janowitz explained, developments in the US military paralleled those of the other militaries of major
industrialized states: these militaries “underwent a continuous and consistent
transformation, accelerated during World War I and World War II and arrested to
varying degrees during peacetime.”19 This transformation encompassed the introduction of modern technology and large-scale managerial techniques that created the mass army and led to the notion and reality of total war.20
The US Army’s participation in World War I was too brief to change
the concept of war that it had developed from the Civil War—one that it subsequently nurtured by the study of Civil War campaigns during the interwar period.
A concept of war stemming from the final campaigns and results of the Civil War
emerged in 1918 when the American military complained about the incompleteness of the destruction of the German army and the Allied victory. Many American officers who would become senior leaders in World War II concluded from
World War I that the advent of mass armies left the frontal assault as the only
course of action. As a result, during the years leading up to World War II, America’s military-strategic culture—one manifest in the military school system that
it had borrowed from the Prussians, the instructors at those schools, and the
scholarly publications associated with those schools—embraced a concept of
war based on the Civil War model. America’s strategic aim of completely imposing its political will upon the vanquished, therefore, would be achieved by applying Grant’s method of utilizing overwhelming combat power to destroy the
enemy’s armed forces and by following Sherman’s approach of destroying the
enemy’s economic resources and will to fight.21
World War II had a tremendous impact on the shaping of US military
culture because it validated and further embedded the cultural predilections inAutumn 2003
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herited from Upton’s era. Officers in the American Army had been able to prepare themselves for the transition from a small peacetime Army in 1940 to the
Army of World War II in part because they had embraced the traditions of the
only grand, European-style war in its history, the American Civil War. One military policy expert noted, “The Civil War had molded the American Army’s conceptions of the nature of full-scale war in ways that would profoundly affect its
conduct of the Second World War.”22 The remembered memory of the Civil War
pointed to massive force as the principal military maxim.

The Postwar and Vietnam: Anathema to the Paradigm
America emerged from World War II in a position of uncontested military superiority: “The war seemed to have confirmed all traditional American
strategic axioms.”23 America had, in concert with its allies, crushed the aggressor, and this victory had been achieved by harnessing and unleashing massive
amounts of materiel. However, the onset of the Cold War precipitated a significant and fundamental shift in US strategy and force structure during peacetime.
NSC 68, in conjunction with the Korean War, “served as a crucial catalyst for the
ultimate implementation of the Army’s strategic plans in the early 1950s.”24 Before World War II, the Army had historically been reduced to minimum strength
after wars, and immediately after World War II the Army had again been demobilized in favor of a strategy that relied principally on strategic air power. NSC 68
helped the Army fulfill its organizational agenda for the Cold War, “thereby revitalizing more than just its overall force structure, but providing much of the institutional rationale for more men, more money, and more equipment.”25
If World War II represented the apotheosis of the US military’s preferred paradigm of war, Vietnam was anathema to it. A preponderance of US officers derived from Vietnam the determination to never again prosecute a war
without the degree of public support more characteristic of a world war than a
small war. As one scholar of American political culture observed: “Ironically,
Vietnam brought us back more intently to the myth of World War II, to the restatement of the just war, or as Studs Terkel cunningly sensed, The Good War, that it
represents.”26 Vietnam was America’s least successful war of the 20th century,
and it was the single most important cause of uncertainty and turbulence for the
US Army in the 1970s. Surprisingly, the Army’s preference for large conventional wars had not been altered as a result of that paradigm’s failure in Southeast
Asia. The Army met growing challenges because it tried to force-fit its paradigm
for war to Vietnam: “The Army’s doctrine, its tactics, its organization, its weapons—its entire repertoire of warfare was designed for conventional war in Europe.”27 In Southeast Asia, “the Army simply performed its repertoire” even
though it was frequently irrelevant to the situation.28 This problem is most pithily
captured by the following quote from a senior officer in Saigon: “I’ll be damned
if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions,
to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”29
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“If World War II represented the apotheosis of
the US military’s preferred paradigm of war,
Vietnam was anathema to it.”

One impediment to changing the approach in Vietnam was the attitude
embraced by many Army leaders that the war in Vietnam was irrelevant to the institution. They argued against making drastic organizational changes on the basis
of the experience in Vietnam, since the war there was perceived as an aberration.
Even still, higher-echelon positions were generally dominated by officers with
World War II experience whose concept of future war, the one the US Army had
to be prepared for, was a European-style general war: “The war in Vietnam is regarded as an exotic interlude between the wars that really count.”30 During the
Vietnam War, US Army leaders also remained cognizant of the organization’s essence: “Its core competence was defeating conventional armies in frontal combat.”31 The Army never arrived at a consensus that a change of approach was
dictated by the nature of the conflict in Vietnam. “An unshakable belief in the essence of the organization precluded organizational learning and has continued to
preclude consensus on the lessons of Vietnam and on required changes in the organization through the present day.”32

Post-Vietnam: Powell and Upton’s Specter
The current preference of the US military is captured in the Powell corollary to the
Weinberger doctrine: the fast, overwhelming and decisive application of maximum
force in the minimum time. Such an approach may produce effective, short-term
results. It is irrelevant, probably even counterproductive, when matched against
the very difficult internal problems that form the underlying problems in target
countries.33

During the 1970s and 1980s, in examining past wars to derive lessons
for future conflicts, the US Army generally tended to look at both Vietnam and
Korea as unpleasant anomalies. Revisiting World War II and embracing the recent technological developments of the conventional 1973 Yom Kippur War, the
American military hoped that the next war would prove to be more like World
War II. In fact the principal architect of the first post-Vietnam Army doctrine,
General William Depuy, was a product of the US Army’s success in World War II
and its failure in Vietnam. In describing him, one study observed: “Depuy was
skeptical of the relevance of the Korean and Vietnam experiences, except as they
Autumn 2003
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reinforced his ideas.”34 Depuy favored armored and combined-arms operations
and he was enamored of the German methods of warfare. It was this experience
and these ideas that appeared in the post-Vietnam doctrine, and around which
Depuy sought to renew the Army. The lessons of the Yom Kippur War helped reinforce the concern of Depuy and his assistants that “Vietnam had been an aberration in the historical trend of warfare, and that the Army had lost a generation’s
worth of technological modernization there while gaining a generation’s worth
of nearly irrelevant combat experience.”35
A 1977 survey of the pages of Military Review also testified to the
Army’s aversion to models other than the big-war paradigm in general, and to the
Vietnam experience in particular. In 1976, the entire year’s volumes included almost no critical appraisal of low-intensity conflicts. In contrast, in 1976 there
was a preponderance of articles that examined large-scale conventional wars and
World War II. Likewise, in 1981 and 1982, Army professional thought, as reflected in Military Review and other professional military journals, pointed to the
same conclusion—a focus on World War II-style conflicts with little critical
analysis of Indochina and little hint at the possibility of small wars in the future.
What’s more, a 1989 survey that examined the 1,400 articles published by Military Review between 1975 and 1989 discovered only 43 articles dedicated to lowintensity conflicts.36
The Army’s first official comprehensive examination of the Vietnam
War criticized its doctrine and conduct of counterinsurgency warfare. Published
by the BDM Corporation in June 1980 for the Army War College, this study concluded that the Army still did not know how to do low-intensity conflict because
the strategic lesson taken from Vietnam was that intervention was to be avoided.
The report also maintained that the US military’s traditional separation between
military and political means significantly hindered the effective employment of
military force in accomplishing objectives established by the political leadership. It criticized the American paradigm of war that focused on the destruction
of enemy forces while ignoring complex and relevant political factors. The BDM
report was essentially an indictment of the US Army’s inappropriate conventional approach to Vietnam. However, this study was essentially shelved in favor
of an assessment more congruous with and supportive of the Army’s preferred
paradigm—the extremely influential work of Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.37
In the late 1970s, the Commandant of the US Army War College arranged for Colonel Summers to be assigned there. Impressed with Summers’
writing ability, the Commandant assigned him to write a book on Vietnam. Summers decided to base his theoretical framework on the new and better 1976 translation of Clausewitz’s On War. Consequently, he argued in On Strategy: A
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War that the Army failed in Vietnam because it
did not focus on conventional warfare. In other words, the Army’s failures in
Vietnam stemmed from its deviation from the big-war approach and its temporary and incomplete experiment with counterinsurgency. Not surprisingly, Sum138
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mers’ book was readily embraced by the mainstream Army culture. On Strategy
has been on the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, and
the official Army professional reading lists for years.38
Summers’ “lessons” became the dominant school of thought and
evolved into the “never-again school.” In the years to come, the never-again
school would dominate American military culture: it was articulated in the
Weinberger Doctrine in the 1980s, and it was subsequently embodied by General
Colin Powell as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the end of the
decade. The “lessons” of Vietnam, coupled with the lessons from the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, were these: the United States should not
commit troops without public support; if America does commit the military, it
should have clearly defined political and military objectives; the United States
should use force only in an overwhelming manner and with the intent of winning;
America should commit force only in defense of vital national interests; and the
United States should use military force only as a last resort.39
Moreover, just as the end of the Cold War was making a conventional
war in Europe improbable, the 1991 Persian Gulf War occurred. The Gulf War
was subsequently offered as a validation of the American paradigm of war, in
contrast to Vietnam:
In the same way that Instant Thunder had served as a counterpoint to the slow escalation of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in Vietnam, so too did this massive
buildup of ground forces signal a rejection of gradualism, of limited force, of the
perceived strategic shortcomings that led to the quagmire in Southeast Asia. Encouraged by Powell, Bush embraced—in Cheney’s infelicitous phrase—“the don’t
screw around school of military strategy.” A force so formidable as to be invincible
would mass in the Saudi Desert, a force so huge that inevitably it contributed to the
momentum propelling the nation toward war.40

The literature related to the Gulf War is replete with the notion that
Desert Storm was fundamentally different from Vietnam and that it represented a
complete validation of the lessons-learned. Vietnam has become the central metaphor of American foreign policy. General Powell’s words to outgoing President
Bush bear consideration also: “Mr. President, you have sent us in harm’s way
when you had to, but never lightly, never hesitantly, never with our hands tied,
never without giving us what we needed to do the job.”41 In another part of his autobiography, after reflecting on a conversation with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Powell wrote of war, “Go in big and end it quickly.”42 Powell regarded the
Weinberger Doctrine as a set of useful guidelines, derived from the lessons of
Vietnam. While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Gulf War, he
seemingly saw his task as ensuring that victory would be made inevitable by applying the Weinberger rules.43
For those who viewed the American way of war as an innate and unalterable manifestation of our strategic culture and national will, Operation Desert
Autumn 2003

139

“Once war breaks out, the US military prefers
to fight big conventional wars
without limitations and without constraints
imposed by its political masters.”

Storm served as validation. After Desert Storm, General Powell published a National Military Strategy that included a list of strategic principles which included
“Decisive Force.” Decisive force is, essentially, an addendum to Weinberger’s criteria. It is “the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries
and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.”44 Implicit in
decisive force, however, is the notion that long conflicts will cause public dissatisfaction with the military, civilian micromanagement, and a critical media.
In sum, the resurgence of the Uptonian paradox during the US military’s
renewal following Vietnam essentially aggregated from a host of events: Depuy’s
and the US doctrine writers’ interpretation of the conventional but high-tech Yom
Kippur War of 1973; Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s superb 1976 translation
of Clausewitz’s On War; the dismissal of the BDM study’s findings that the
Army’s problems in Vietnam stemmed from its efforts to conventionalize the conflict; Summers’1982 On Strategy, which argued that the US military failed in Vietnam because it did not fight conventionally enough; and, finally, the 1984
Weinberger-Powell doctrine, which codified in distilled, bumper-sticker form the
key components of Summers’ book—perhaps best summarized by the statement,
“We don’t do Vietnams.” As a footnote, another indicator that the post-Vietnam
military’s intellectual renaissance reembraced Clausewitz, as well as the German
military, was the promulgation of maneuver warfare theory and the proliferation of
terms such as “schwerpunkt” and “auftragstaktik” in the lexicon of the 1980s US
Army. One military historian even commented, “The maneuverists prefer to use
the German term auftragstaktik, and act like they have found another piece of the
True (Iron) Cross.”45

Conclusion
Consequent to the Civil War and Upton’s influence came the fusion of
Jomini and Clausewitz, the embrace of the Prussian/German military system as
the ideal, and a focus on conventional war and massive firepower. Upton and his
disciples, as advocates of the conventional Prussian model and of minimum civilian interference in military affairs, imbued these ideas in the profession
through institutions and journals. One result was that anything outside the core
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paradigm came to be viewed as aberrant and ephemeral. More recent scholarship
also points to the US military-strategic cultural tendency to divorce the military
from the political: “In the United States, one of the basic assumptions of armed
force organization at the national level is that war-fighting is an autonomous
sphere.”46 In other words, war is an activity that is to be prosecuted by soldiers
without significant interference from politicians. “This is an attitude with deep
roots in the organizational culture of the Army.”47 Yet it is somewhat strange that
an institution with more aggregate history and experience fighting irregular conflicts of limited intensity would have its core culture so profoundly influenced by
Sherman, Upton, and the World War II experience.
The US military-strategic culture that emerged at the end of the 20th
century is one that ostensibly embraces the Clausewitzian axiom of subordinating the military instrument to political ends, but, in all actuality, it is truly
Jominian. Once war breaks out, the US military prefers to fight big conventional
wars without limitations and without constraints imposed by its political masters.48 The most significant feature of the United States’12-year effort in Vietnam
may be what little impact it has had on strategic thinking in the US Army. The
United States was as unprepared in the 1980s as it was in the 1960s to fight a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. For the Army, whose focus had been on the
Central Front in Europe and the prospect of defending against a Soviet assault,
Vietnam was but a large bump in the road. Many officers say that Vietnam remained unstudied because senior officers felt that in doctrinal terms the Asian
experience was irrelevant to Europe.49
Since the US military ostensibly worships Clausewitz as the principal
prophet of war, it should adhere to the central Clausewitzian dictum that the military is an instrument of policy. But while the US military’s core culture in no way
argues for usurping civilian control of the military, it does exhibit a tendency to
influence or reshape its political masters’ views in order to make those views on
war congruent with the military’s preferred paradigm for war. This tendency to
prescribe and circumscribe what wars it will fight and not fight was first manifested by Upton after the Civil War and the first translation of Clausewitz. It was
reinforced by the World Wars, Vietnam, the 1976 translation of Clausewitz, and
Colonel Summers’ book. The Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Corollary
have helped perpetuate and exacerbate this tendency of the military to prescribe
to the civilian elite what kind of wars the military does and does not fight.
Finally, an insistence on a preferred conventional paradigm in the context of civil-military relations also creates an anomalous and unhealthy situation
in which the military is prescribing to its legitimate civilian leadership what kind
of instrument it will be and not be. This has become even more problematic after
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act’s effects were realized in the 1990s. That legislation, coupled with a diminishing depth of military expertise among civilian
leaders and staff, may have actually increased the organizational salience of the
military. In other words, it may have conferred upon the military more leverage
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when civilian leaders make policy decisions on when and how to use force. As
one expert on civil-military relations noted, “Individual military decisionmakers
are better prepared to deal with current and future decision-making than are their
civilian counterparts.”50 They are better prepared because they are more pertinently educated and have had more relevant experience.
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